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WHO IS THE WITNESS TO AN INTERNET CRIME:
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, DIGITAL
FORENSICS, AND CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Merritt Baer†
The ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is part of it.
Far from being divided between them as between two poles which
mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding
to the other . . . [T]hese conflicts which break forth are not
between the ideal and reality, but between two ideals, that of
yesterday and that of to-day.
1
—Jurgen Habermas

Abstract
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the
accused the right to confront witnesses against him. In this article I
examine child pornography prosecution, in which we must apply this
constitutional standard to digital forensic evidence. I ask, “Who is
the witness to an Internet crime?”
The Confrontation Clause proscribes the admission of hearsay.
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court stated that the primary
concern was reliability and that hearsay might be admissible if the
reliability concerns were assuaged. Twenty-four years later, in
Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court repositioned the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment as a procedural right.
Even given assurances of reliability, “testimonial” evidence requires
a physical witness.
This witness production requirement could have been sensible in
an era when actions were physically tied to humans. But in an

† Merritt Baer is a Colorado native, a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law
School. She has worked in cyber law and policy in all three branches of government and runs a
cyber consulting company: www.merrittrachelbaer.com. She would like to thank her family for
fostering an adventurousness that led her to embrace technology questions, and in particular to
her grandmother Nancy Van Buren.
1. 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND
SYSTEM 71 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 3d ed. 1989).

31

BAER

32

2/3/2014 12:21 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

Internet age, actions may take place at degrees removed from any
physical person.
The hunt for a witness to digital forensic evidence involved in
child pornography prosecution winds through a series of law
enforcement protocols, on an architecture owned and operated by
private companies. Sentencing frameworks associated with child
pornography similarly fail to reflect awareness of the way that
actions occur online, even while they reinforce what is at stake.
The tensions I point to in this article are emblematic of emerging
questions in Internet law. I show that failing to link the application of
law and its undergirding principles to a digital world does not escape
the issue, but distorts it. This failure increases the risk that our efforts
to preserve Constitutional rights are perverted or made impotent.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I argue that as digital information becomes more
prolific and data gathering operates yet more independently of human
control, we will need to reconsider the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause rights. The Court has attempted to untangle
Confrontation Clause implications in the areas of lab forensics,
including urinalysis results and DNA testing.2 However, child
pornography prosecution represents a new manifestation of
constitutional questions regarding digital forensic evidence, and as an
Internet crime, it forms a case study for the difficulty in applying
constitutional case law to Internet evidence.3 Child pornography
prosecution involves fairly traditional business records collected in
the ordinary course of Internet business, and it also includes data
collected or aggregated in response to a reported suspicion of
criminality. Specific questions arising from these forms of digitized,
aggregated evidence prompt broad questions—Who is the witness to
an Internet crime? How is that witness to be examined? Ultimately,
how do we preserve the guarantees of process that foster a sense of
justice in trials?
I begin in Part I with a general review of developments leading
to the current landscape of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause protections, including factors informing determinations of
what is testimonial and what it means to require confrontation of a
witness. In Part II, I offer examples in current case law involving
forensic evidence and the Confrontation Clause, which has been in
urinalysis cases and the use of DNA evidence. In Part III, I delve into
the fairly new questions raised by the use of Internet records in child
pornography prosecution, looking at the First Circuit’s holding in
United States v. Cameron in particular.4 Finally, in Part IV, I explore

2. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011) (involving
urinalysis reports); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (involving DNA evidence).
3. Recognized, that many in the community seeking to address child sexual abuse do not
find the term child pornography appropriate because of the possibility that it normalizes the
sexual abuse by categorizing it in terms applied to adult pornography. However, since the
statutory language refers to this category of illegal images as child pornography, I too use this
terminology. See Memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of
Justice,
to
all
U.S.
Attorneys,
(Jan.
1998),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm02467.htm (“Prior to the
enactment of the Act . . . [t]he term ‘child pornography,’ was only a lay term and not a term of
art. The Act, however, amends [S]ection 2256 and uses the term ‘child pornography’ . . . .”)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
4. United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).
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some of the broader questions that the transition to digital records
raises and I argue that we need to make a decision as to the intent and
therefore the substance of the Confrontation Clause in the context of
digital evidence.
I.

THE EVOLUTION AND CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT’S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. The Confrontation Clause: General Background

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees,
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”5 That is, it
proscribes the admission of hearsay statements.6 The Supreme Court
clarified that the right is one of “face-to-face” confrontation.7
Despite the blanket phrasing of the Confrontation Clause’s
guarantee, the Supreme Court recognized explicitly as early as 1895
that the right of confrontation is “subject to exceptions, recognized
long before the adoption of the Constitution.”8 In Mattox, the Court
upheld the use of testimony at a second trial when the witness had
died after testifying in the first trial, explaining that “A technical
adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally
be carried further than is necessary to the just protection of the
accused, and further than the safety of the public will warrant.”9
Accordingly, the rules of evidence recognize a number of exceptions
to the prohibition on hearsay. In this section I explore the trajectory
of the Court’s definitions as to what evidence the Confrontation
Clause’s prohibition on hearsay does or does not reach.
B. What Triggers Confrontation Clause Protections?
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court established that the

5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (The Clause was incorporated to states by the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
6. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011) (hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted).
7. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) (citation omitted). This right, however, is
not absolute. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (the Sixth Amendment does not
categorically prohibit a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant
outside of the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television).
8. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
9. Id. at 243.
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primary concern surrounding hearsay evidence was reliability.10
However, even absent the cross-examination provided by the
Confrontation Clause as a safeguard of reliability, hearsay might be
admissible nevertheless, over a Confrontation Clause objection, if it
met sufficient “indicia of reliability.”11 This included evidence
admitted under a “firmly rooted exception” to the hearsay rule,12 but
could also apply if the party presenting the evidence could meet the
standard of showing “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”13
A few decades later, Crawford v. Washington reconceived both
the reasoning behind the admissibility of certain hearsay statements,
and the criteria for determining those statements that might form
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause’s particularized protection.14
The Court rejected reliability as the basis for the analytical framework
and instead postured the Clause as a procedural right. Rather than
merely existing as one form of guarantee as to the reliability of
hearsay evidence, the Crawford Court held that the purpose of the
Clause is to guarantee the accused the opportunity to confront
accusers whose statements are the result of government efforts to
gather evidence for prosecution.15

10. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas termed
cross-examination “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 502 U. S.
346, 361-63 (1992) (citation omitted) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment, noting that this rule applies even if the confession is “found to be reliable”). Note
that in White, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia) voiced originalist concerns, 502 U.S.
346, 358 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment), that would later manifest in Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the majority in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
11. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66.
12. Id. See also FED. R. EVID. 803, 804(b); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992)
(permitting the spontaneous declaration and medical treatment exceptions); United States v.
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (hearsay exceptions include the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay prohibition). The Court did not include the statements made by a 2-year-old girl in
Idaho v. Wright regarding abuse by her mother and mother’s boyfriend. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
Because the statements were not made spontaneously or to obtain medical treatment, and
particularly in light of the interviewer’s suggestive interview technique, the Court held that the
statements by the young girl did not fall into one of the recognized exceptions and lacked
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness. Id. at 827. Particularly before Crawford v. Washington,
the Court acknowledged that these “firmly rooted exceptions” still included a judgment on the
reliability of the statements: “Established practice, in short, must confirm that statements falling
within a category of hearsay inherently ‘carr[y] special guarantees of credibility’ essentially
equivalent to, or greater than, those produced by the Constitution’s preference for crossexamined trial testimony.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (citation omitted).
13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
14. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
15. See id. at 55-56 (opportunity for cross-examination is “dispositive, and not merely
one of several ways to establish reliability.”).
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia referenced the trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh in 1603. Raleigh was sentenced to death based on Lord
Cobham’s statements to the Privy Council, without opportunity for
cross-examination. Justice Scalia concluded, “[t]he constitutional
text, like the history underlying the common-law right of
confrontation . . . reflects an especially acute concern with a specific
type of out-of-court statement,”16—and these are “testimonial”
statements.
C. What is Testimonial?
Crawford therefore established as the crux of admissibility the
question of whether a statement is testimonial; testimonial statements
are inadmissible until and unless the Confrontation Clause can be
satisfied. How to determine what is testimonial remained unclear.
Crawford listed three categories that would qualify as testimonial
statements, the third and most expansive of which is, “statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.”17 The hearsay at issue in Crawford was
certainly testimonial, as it was a statement made during police
interrogation.
In companion cases Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana18 the Court attempted to define further what is testimonial:
statements are non-testimonial (admissible without raising
Confrontation Clause objection) “when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency.”19 Meanwhile, statements made during
police questioning are testimonial (raising Confrontation Clause
objection) when “the circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past

16. Id. at 51.
17. Id. at 52. The first two categories are: (1) “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions,” (2) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially.” Id.
18. Hammon v. Indiana, 546 U.S. 1213 (2006); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813
(2006) (the Court heard Davis and Hammon in tandem).
19. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
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events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”20 Based on
this distinction, the statements in Davis (a victim telling a 911
operator that Davis, the accused, was beating her) were nontestimonial as they described ongoing events, while the statement in
Hammon was testimonial and triggered Confrontation Clause
protection because it “took place some time after the events described
were over,” thus its primary purpose was to prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.21
The Crawford opinion did not clearly define “testimonial.”22 It
laid out a number of situational factors that may enter into a
determination of whether a statement is testimonial. While formality
is “essential” to a testimonial utterance, “interrogation” is not
essential to formality.23
Statements to someone other than a government employee in the
course of an investigation are much less likely to be testimonial24—
though the Court also accepted that the 911 operator in Davis was
committing “acts of the police.”25
Indicia of “solemnity”26 may be relevant, reinforced by the fact
that making false statements to a government official is usually a
crime. The Crawford Court affirmed that statements made to a coconspirator turned FBI informant in Bourjaily v. United States were
non-testimonial.27
Crawford also outlined exceptions in which testimonial hearsay
is nevertheless admissible: (1) when the declarant was subjected to
cross-examination at the time of the statement and is unavailable for

20. Id.
21. Id. at 830 (the Court further clarified that statements might evolve from nontestimonial to testimonial as the urgency of the situation changed, implying that the primary
purpose had changed from emergency assistance to evidence collection).
22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted) (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice O’Connor, expressed as much in his concurrence, stating, “[T]he thousands of federal
prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the
specific kinds of ‘testimony’ the Court lists is now covered by the new rule.”).
23. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 823 (the Court maintained, “[T]he Framers were no more
willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended
question than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.”).
24. For instance, in Crawford, the Court reexamined the statements from the victim to the
police officer in White v. Illinois, even though the victim made identical statements to her
babysitter, mother, and a nurse and doctor; presumably, the focus was on statements made to
law enforcement because the others were nontestimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58.
25. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
26. Id. at 836-37, 840.
27. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58.
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cross-examination despite diligent efforts of the prosecution;28 (2)
where the declarant is unavailable because of misconduct by the
defendant;29 (3) where the defendant has opportunity at trial to crossexamine the declarant;30 (4) where the statements were not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted.31
D. What Is a Witness?
While some legal scholars anticipated challenges arising out of
forensic lab reports or other types of potentially-testimonial records,32
the Crawford Court did not address the application of the (postCrawford) Confrontation Clause to medical, business or other types
of records. Case law was ad hoc33 until 2009, when the Court applied
the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.34
Luis Melendez-Diaz was arrested making a cocaine sale in a
Kmart parking lot in Massachusetts. At trial, the prosecution
introduced bags of the cocaine he was distributing as well as drug
analysis certificates prepared by a lab technician who had analyzed
the drugs and identified them as cocaine.35 In a contested 5-4
decision, the Melendez-Diaz Court held that introduction of forensic
evidence in the form of lab reports is testimonial. Rejecting
contentions that lab reports are non-testimonial business records
under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), or that they are not
accusatory because they contain scientific data, Justice Scalia wrote
for the majority that toxicology reports “are incontrovertibly ‘a
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.’”36

.

28. Id. at 54-69.
29. Id. at 61-62; see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
30. See id.
31. This is the basic threshold for the definition of hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (2011).
32. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791 (2007).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 452 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2006) (warrants of deportation
signed by an immigration official are not testimonial); United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394
(6th Cir. 2005) (business records are not testimonial); State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374, 377
n.1 (N.D. 2006) (surveying differing judicial views on whether lab reports are testimonial).
34. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
35. Id. at 308.
36. Id. at 310 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). It is interesting to note that the military
jurisprudence regarding Confrontation Clause triggers in urinalysis cases involves different
factors. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has held consistent with
Melendez-Diaz, there are a number of military-specific circumstances that affect the
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The Melendez-Diaz majority characterized their determination to
be “little more than the application of our holding in Crawford v.
Washington.”37 This dismissal seems disingenuous; the holding in
Melendez-Diaz necessarily included a number of determinations.
For one, the Melendez-Diaz holding implied a judgment about
what a witness could be—without a witness to call to the stand, the
text of the Confrontation Clause is nonsensical or inapplicable. The
Melendez-Diaz Court held that Melendez-Diaz’s Confrontation
Clause rights were violated when the prosecution introduced over his
objection “certificates of state laboratory analysts” that identified
cocaine at his state-court drug trial. The determination seems to have
revolved around the posture of the evidence at issue—the fact that the
certificates consisted of evidence “against him,” and Justice Scalia
specifically pointed to the language of the Confrontation Clause’s
guarantee.38
Justice Scalia wrote, “To the extent the analysts were witnesses. .
.they certainly provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact
necessary for his conviction—that the substance he possessed was
cocaine.”39 Since the level of alertness or sleepiness of the lab
technicians was never introduced as a factor in Melendez-Diaz, it
seems fair to assume that one can be considered a witness even when
mindlessly collecting information as part of one’s job. Is there a
consciousness requirement in witnessing, and if not, where is the
distinct line between that information captured by a machine—or the
Internet—and that information which has a human component?40

determination. Unlike civilian contexts, military urinalysis is performed routinely, not only in
the context of an investigation; the samples are identified only by social security number rather
than name; and there is presumably less risk of a forensic analyst “responding to a request from
a law enforcement official [feeling] pressure—or [i]ncentive—to alter the evidence in a manner
favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 318; see, e.g., United States v. Blazier, 68 M.J. 439, 444
(C.A.A.F. 2010).
37. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 327.
38. Id. at 314.
39. Id. at 313.
40. The Eleventh Circuit has held explicitly that “[i]n light of the constitutional text and
the historical focus of the Confrontation Clause, we are persuaded that the witnesses with whom
the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses.” United States v. Lamons, 532
F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir.
2007); United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003); 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 380, at 65 (2d ed. 1994) (“[N]othing ‘said’ by a
machine . . . is hearsay”). However, the qualities of machines are becoming more blurred as
evidence produced through a human-derived process such as software may have the qualities of
a human-generated document without any action that directly involves human hands.
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Ought we to consider as witness the hardware or software engineer if
that hardware or software was later involved in data collection or
analysis that produced damning evidence?41 The Court seems to have
asserted a right to call a witness without fully considering whom that
witness will be in cases that involve digital forensic evidence.
E. Post-Melendez-Diaz Forensic Evidence
In the years following Melendez-Diaz and the application of the
Confrontation Clause to toxicology reports, the Supreme Court
applied post-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to other
forms of forensic evidence, including blood alcohol level results in
Bullcoming v. New Mexico42 and DNA evidence in Williams v.
Illinois.43 In both of these cases, the evidence itself was collected in
the course of an investigation that included the possibility of later
prosecution.
Like Melendez-Diaz, they involved unfavorable
evidence in the form of forensic test results produced by a machine
and certified by a person.
In Bullcoming, as in Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that
introduction of the evidence over a Confrontation Clause exception
violated the petitioner’s right to confront witnesses against him.44 In
Williams, the Court held that an expert witness could testify as to
“others’ testimonial statements if those statements are not themselves
admitted as evidence.”45 Thus, the Court made the dubious claim that
the inadmissibility of the underlying testimonial evidence could be
isolated from the expert’s reliance upon them and escaped the
question for the time by hinging the holding on expert witness law
rather than a testimonial-ness determination.
Child pornography forces us to re-confront and reevaluate the
Confrontation Clause questions that arose in these recent cases, and it
also raises new ones. Child pornography possession or distribution
cases force the issue because the evidence in a child pornography

41. In a recent child pornography appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that an accused has the
right to inspect software used to prosecute him if “functions of the program were relevant to his
defense,” rather than to accept the FBI’s affidavits of how the filesharing program works.
United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The movement toward
increasingly particularized levels of forensic evidence in e-discovery seems tied to a general
reconsideration of the level of relevance that courts view in software and hardware
characteristics to cybercrime cases.
42. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
43. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221.
44. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716.
45. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2223.
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prosecution consists of a range of evidence types, most of which
include business records in the colloquial sense but many of which
are not business records that meet the legal standard of the evidentiary
exemption. These range from digital data collected routinely in the
course of business and without targeting a particular user, to digital
evidence collected, labeled, and assembled in preparation for
prosecution. The first seems to be textbook business record
exception; the second sounds like testimonial evidence that triggers a
Confrontation Clause right. In practice, drawing the line between the
two is not so clear, and the determinations raise fundamental
questions that will apply to digital evidence standards more broadly.
II. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PROSECUTION COMPELS US TO
REEXAMINE THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Child Pornography Is Cyber Crime
As the days of back-alley or mail-order exchanges of child
pornography46 photographs in paper bags are largely over, child
pornography today is an area of cyber crime, and its enforcement
relies upon digital forensic data as evidence.47 I take it as an example
because of the range of Internet data that is necessarily involved in a
child pornography prosecution, particularly in child pornography
possession or distribution cases.
Child pornography is a unique area of First Amendment
jurisprudence: the Supreme Court has held since 1982 that
constitutional speech protections do not apply to child pornography,
even when the material does not meet the obscenity test outlined in
Miller.48 The rationales for criminalizing child pornography are
distinct. In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that the
state’s interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors is a
compelling “government objective of surpassing importance,” and the
law in question carefully drawn to protect children from the mental,
physical, and sexual abuse associated with child pornography, thus its
proscription of child pornography did not violate the First

46. The legal definition of the term “child pornography” can be found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Richard Wortley & Stephen Smallbone, Child Pornography on the Internet,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV. (May 2006),
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e04062000.pdf (last updated May 2012).
48. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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Amendment.49
While the precedent for criminalizing child pornography is well
established since Ferber in 1982, child pornography jurisprudence
encapsulates many of the dilemmas of applying constitutional law
online. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it results in a significant number of
appeals—one researcher noted that “[a]lmost 70 percent of all
reported appellate decisions involving the search or seizure of digital
evidence are concerned with the recovery of child pornography.”50 In
the United States, child pornography possession, distribution, and
receipt are prosecuted through 18 U.S.C. Section 2252,51 “Certain
activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of
minors,” and Section 2252A, “Certain activities relating to material
constituting or containing child pornography.”52 Federal law defines
child pornography as “any visual depiction of sexually explicit
conduct involving a minor,”53 and they are perhaps more accurately
described as “child sexual abuse images.”54
B. The Convictions in United States v. Cameron
The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
(NCMEC) houses a database of known child victims and runs a
“CyberTipline” for entities to report suspected child pornography.
There is a statutory duty for any organization “engaged in providing
an electronic communication service or a remote computing service to
the public, through a facility or means of interstate or foreign
commerce” to report apparent violations of federal child pornography
law.55
On March 15, 2007, Yahoo! received an anonymous report of

49. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). The Ferber Court also identified an
impetus for the criminalization of child pornography to be drying up the market for child
pornography. Id. at 761-62 (“The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials.”). See
also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (one should go through levels in the distribution
chain).
50. Thomas K. Clancy, Digital Child Pornography and the Fourth Amendment, THE
UNIV.
OF
MISS.
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/Clancy,%20Digital%20Child%20Pornography%20and
%20the%204th%20Amendment%2007.14.10.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 628 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2258A(a)(1) (2012)).
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child pornography images housed in one of its user’s accounts named
“lilhottee0000.”56 Yahoo! protocol established a series of actions
which included removing the account, searching it, and if the search
indicated child pornography, generating a report for the NCMEC
CyberTipline (CP Report or CyberTipline Report) and keeping a
receipt of the report. On August 3, 2007, NCMEC sent a report of
child pornography that Yahoo! had documented to the Maine State
Police Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) unit.57 Later,
NCMEC sent another report regarding another set of child
pornography images, housed in the Yahoo! Photo account of user
“harddude0000.”58 Both CyberTipline Reports listed the same
Internet protocol (IP) address, 76.179.26.185, in a section of the
report titled “Suspect Information.”59
An ICAC detective traced the IP address to the provider Time
Warner.60 Subpoenaing Time Warner, the detective determined that
the IP address led to the Cameron residence in the relevant time
periods.61 ICAC seized four computers at the Cameron residence, and
a forensic examiner examined them in March 2008.62 Forensic
examination of Cameron’s seized computers showed child
pornography stored on two of the machines.63 It also showed that
someone executed Internet searches for terms related to child
pornography, and that someone had signed into a service (now
defunct) called “Google Hello” and used usernames to send and
receive child pornography.64 ICAC served search warrants on Yahoo!
for activity logs related to the accounts accessed from Cameron’s
computers, and on Google for activity logs related to the Google
Hello account.65
The data recovered by those activity logs included emails in
which Cameron sent and received child pornography images.66 A
federal grand jury indicted Cameron on sixteen counts of child
pornography-related crimes, each of which included a specific date on

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 627.
Id. at 629.
Id.
Id.
Cameron, 699 F.3d at 629.
Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 630-31.
Cameron, 699 F.3d at 630.
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which Cameron either sent or received child pornography.67 Cameron
“contended that Yahoo! acted as an agent of the government when it
searched password-protected accounts for child pornography before
reporting to NCMEC,” therefore they triggered his Confrontation
Clause rights.68
The district court held that the searches were valid because
Yahoo! voluntarily searched the accounts without direction from the
government.69 Further, the district court held that so long as the
government established that the Yahoo! records were kept in the
ordinary course of business, they were non-testimonial and could be
admitted as “business records” under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6) if they were authenticated.70 The NCMEC reports and
attached images were also admissible as business records, the court
held, because NCMEC “simply forwarded information it received
from Yahoo!, information which itself consisted of business
records.”71
At trial, the government introduced the Yahoo! evidence and the
Google Hello evidence via testimony of legal assistants in the
companies’ respective Legal Compliance Departments. The legal
assistants were familiar with Yahoo!’s and Google’s data retention
practices but had no technical training.72 The government also
introduced evidence related to the NCMEC CyberTipline reports
through testimony of the executive director of NCMEC.73
The First Circuit reviewed the Internet forensic data by creating
three separate categories: (1) Internet account information and activity
records, (2) “electronic receipts of Yahoo’s CP Reports
to . . . produced by Yahoo! in response to search warrants,”74 and (3)
NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports.
1. Internet Account Information and Activity Records
Not every business record falls within the business record

67. Id. at 630-31.
68. Id. at 631.
69. Id. at 631-32 (citing United States v. Cameron, 729 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423-24 (D. Me.
2010) [hereinafter Cameron II]).
70. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 641 (citing United States v. Cameron, 733 F. Supp. 2d 182,
188-89 (D. Me. 2010) [hereinafter Cameron III]).
71. Id. at 632.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 629.
74. Id. at 638.
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exception to the hearsay prohibition. The First Circuit acknowledged
this, citing the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz as evidence.75 However,
these account information and activity logs were all made at or near
the time of the event, and created and kept in the regular course of
business,76 “totally unrelated to any trial or law enforcement
purpose.”77 Thus the court held that they were properly introduced as
non-testimonial business records.78 It included the Yahoo! Account
Management Tool, Yahoo! Login Tracker data, and Google Hello
Connection logs.79
2. Receipts of Yahoo! CP
While the receipts of the CP reports are also business records,
the First Circuit wrote, “there is strong evidence that the CP reports
were prepared with the primary purpose of establishing or proving
past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.”80
Yahoo! created these reports in response to the statutory duty to
report apparent violations of child pornography law.81
They
contained Internet records and employee notes, including hearsay
statements by Yahoo! employees that linked the Internet Service
Provider (ISP) to the suspected child pornography. The First Circuit
weighed the fact that the reports were only made in response to
suspected child pornography, that they used the term “suspect”
repeatedly to identify Cameron, and that once created, Yahoo! sent
the CP Report to NCMEC, knowing that NCMEC would forward
them to law enforcement.82 Thus, the “objective test” of the “primary
purpose” led the court to consider this evidence testimonial.83
Comparing these reports to the evidence generated in Davis,84
the First Circuit stated that “NCMEC effectively acted as an agent of
law enforcement,” and concluded that “the CP reports at issue here. .
.fall somewhere in the range between volunteered testimony and

75. Id. at 640.
76. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 641. (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(6)).
77. Id. at 642.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 643 (citation omitted).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A)(1).
82. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 644.
83. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (statements made by a train engineer in
earlier investigation were inadmissible hearsay at the trial that occurred after the engineer died
because the “primary utility” of the report was “in litigating, not in railroading”).
84. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)
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responses to an interrogation.”85
3. NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports
The Circuit Court ruled that the NCMEC CyberTipline Reports
were also testimonial. They were “introduced—and admitted—into
evidence to prove the truth of the assertions contained therein, most
importantly: that child pornography images were uploaded onto a
particular Yahoo! account, and that the most recent one of those
images was uploaded from a specific IP address on a specific date and
time.”86 These reports were the link between the specific dates of
individual criminal counts, and the accused’s IP address.
The Court conducted a harmless error analysis and concluded
that while some of the counts could be affirmed as based on properly
admitted evidence, other counts relied primarily on inadmissible
evidence and required reversal.87
III. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE QUESTIONS FOR THE DIGITAL AGE
A. How Should We Weigh Logistical Concerns?
On the one hand, the idea that we abridge constitutional rights
based on (in)convenience seems appalling; what’s more, the Court
has plainly stated that the Confrontation Clause right is a “particular”
one: “testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”88 On the other
hand, as Justice Breyer emphasized in his Melendez-Diaz
concurrence, in the current day requiring lab technician testimony for
all data would create insurmountable logistical problems.89
Justice Kennedy wrote that hinging prosecution on the
practicality of requiring an FBI analyst (of which there are 500
employees, conducting more than one million tests annually) to
“board a plane, find his or her way to an unfamiliar courthouse, and

85. Id. at 46. See infra Part III.A.
86. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 651.
87. Id. at 652-53.
88. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S 36, 61 (2004). The Crawford Court stated
explicitly, “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes.” Id. at 62.
89. Judge G. Ross Anderson Jr., a District Court Judge for the District of South Carolina,
recently bemoaned, “[T]he decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming threaten to overwhelm
the justice system by constantly requiring the country’s limited number of forensic analysts to
appear at trial.” G. Ross Anderson Jr., Returning to Confrontation Clause Sanity, THE FEDERAL
LAWYER, Mar. 2013, at 71, available at http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/march13-entire.pdf.aspx.
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sit there waiting to read aloud notes made months ago” for each test
would be, in practice, “a windfall to defendants” as it would surely
result in fewer prosecutions and convictions.90
Regardless of what ought to be a consideration, the proliferation
of data makes logistical issues increasingly prominent.
The
government has limited resources, and we are swimming in data.
Often that data might be somewhere in middle ground, as the Yahoo!
CP Reports were in Cameron: data assembled and lightly annotated
with obvious notes. In time, that stage of analysis might be executed
by software programmed by humans but not directly by human
analysts. Would that change the outcome entirely?91
Moreover, if the criminal justice community refuses to confront
the logistical realities, the obvious solution for laboratories, ISPs or
other entities that generate forensic data will be to simply produce
unsigned reports that do not identify the technician who ran the test or
analyst who compiled the data.92 Justice Alito dodged this in
Williams when he accepted expert testimony under the shady claim
that the expert was not testifying to the truth of the reports but on the
hypothetical question, ‘if the report was accurate, would it match the
defendant’s DNA?’93
Justice Alito also wrote for the plurality that the report was not
intended to be used as evidence against the defendant, so there was no
right of confrontation involved.94 In distinguishing the “formality”
(and therefore testimonial nature) of the Yahoo! receipts of the reports
it sent to NCMEC from the Cellmark DNA results in Williams, the
First Circuit cited the Williams plurality: “the technicians who prepare
a DNA profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will turn
out to be incriminating or exonerating—or both.”95 In contrast,

90. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343.
91. See Karen Neville, Programmers and Forensic Analyses: Accusers Under the
Confrontation Clause, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 18 (2011) (Neville identifies the potential for
fraud and error in forensic lab tests and the weaknesses in analyst testimony, and advocates
requiring the programmer to testify, as “[T]he programmer [is] the true accuser—not the
machine merely following the protocols he created”).
92. As Justice Kagan wrote in her Williams dissent, “The prosecution could avoid its
demands by using the right kind of forms with the right kind of language. (It would not take
long to devise the magic words and rules—principally, never call anything a ‘certificate.’)”
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2276 (2012). Moreover, “The new conventions, precisely
by making out-of-court statements less ‘solem[n],’ would also make them less reliable—and so
turn the Confrontation Clause upside down.” Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 2223-24.
94. Id. at 2226.
95. Cameron, 699 F.3d at 647 (quoting Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244).
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“[n]obody at Yahoo! who was involved in creating the CP Reports
could possibly have believed the CP Reports could be other than
incriminating.”96 This distinction seems dubious.
To begin, the DNA test would not arrive at a lab if there were
not a suspicion, which is to say, a real possibility that the DNA
evidence would be incriminating. Additionally, the DNA report was
generated by a laboratory that fulfills government forensic lab work;
Cellmark might not be “an agent of law enforcement” in every
context, but it was certainly an agent of the government here.97
Finally, as the facts played out, the DNA report was incriminating;
presumably the prosecution would not have sought to use it if it had
not been. There may be valid reasons to explain a court’s decision to
find DNA evidence not to require cross-examination, but the idea that
it is not linked directly enough to the production of incriminating
evidence does not seem viable.
B. Is a Surrogate Witness Sufficient?
Much more credible might be the contention that there are
logistical hurdles to producing the particular lab technician who
generated the lab results. This, of course, is also the root of the
questions about “surrogate” witnesses or expert witnesses that
effectively, if not legally, stand in.98 If it were easy to produce the
technician who created the lab reports, there would need be no
discussion of surrogates.
Yet the Court has explicitly rejected the concept of a “surrogate”
witness.99 While there may be varying definitions as to what
constitutes a “surrogate” witness, I reject the notion generally because
the Supreme Court made clear that the Confrontation Clause is “a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”100 Thus either there
is a Confrontation Clause requirement present or there is not; to my
mind, there can be no faithfully constitutional “surrogate witness.”
(Note that the Court’s reasoning in Williams for accepting expert
witness’ testimony hinged on the inadmissibility of the underlying
testimonial evidence; it did not recognize the idea of surrogate

96. Id.
97. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221.
98. See FED. R. EVID. 703 for rules on expert witnesses.
99. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
100. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). It “commands, not that the
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.” Id.; see generally Mnookin, supra note 32.
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witnessing.101)
Rather than a viable legal proposition, the notion of a surrogate
witness seems to be a reaction to the logistical realities that now
confront Sixth Amendment applications.102
I recognize these
logistical realities and suggest that we have the conversation outright
about what we aim to accomplish in guaranteeing a right to confront
witnesses, and what the limitations of our system mean for that right.
It is a question that digital evidence will only exacerbate, as we
collect and retain drastically more data, and rely more heavily upon
intelligent Internet-based analysis systems to process that data.
Criminal forensic evidence just isn’t what it used to be.
C. Is the Confrontation Clause Insulation Against Error, or Is It
Something Else?
The Melendez-Diaz holding was penned by an originalist,103 and
yet it seems that the holding in Melendez-Diaz may have been
motivated more by the broad pursuit of the trappings of justice than
textualist adherence to a process-focused constitutional right. If a lab
technician’s signature does not trigger the requirement of a lab
technician’s testimony, lab reports might simply venture
unaccompanied into a court room. As such, while there may not be
much value in cross-examining a lab technician who may or may not
recall pressing the button on a particular set of samples, the Court has
leaned toward requiring the technician to testify (and it then employed
the “expert witness” dodge in Williams).
Justice Scalia voiced concern that “[f]orensic evidence is not
uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”104 While true, it is
not clear that a ‘witness’s testimony immunizes forensic evidence
from the risks of manipulation or error, either. It is especially unclear
what is added in the way of verifiability or truthfulness if the witness
is a member of the Google legal department who never had a
technical understanding of the process nor participated in the

101. Williams, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2222.
102. Even those who recognize “surrogate witnesses” as though they are a real alternative
in the confrontation clause context seem to do so in tacit or explicit acknowledgement that it is a
reaction to logistical constraints. See, e.g., Nicholas Klaiber, Confronting Reality: Surrogate
Forensic Science Witnesses Under the Confrontation Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 199 (2011).
103. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (Thomson West, 2012).
104. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318.
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collection or retention of the data.105 By the same token, it is not
particularly clear that it would be useful to call in the computer
scientist who can testify to the process by which he developed a
computer program to operate, but has no specific knowledge of how it
may have been used by a defendant for a particular crime.
Before Crawford, the Court considered the need for
Confrontation Clause rights in terms of how reliable the evidence
was. This meant that the exceptions were instances in which the
Court found that certain “statements were so inherently reliable that
cross-examination would have been superfluous”106 It also meant that
the Court explicitly held that Confrontation Clause rights had a
“truthfinding function.”107 This function undergirded the right—
witnesses were there to provide more information to the jury and
those witnesses that were to be called were to be those that knew
something about the crime.
It is significant that the Confrontation Clause was conceived at a
time when testimonial evidence against an accused consisted of
human testimony; requiring that same human to appear in court might
reasonably lead to guarantees of trustworthiness that went to the truth
of their accusations. (This is presumably why “demeanor of the
witness”108 is one value the Court found to be conferred by the
confrontation right.) In the case of digital evidence that did not
originate with human authorship, the value of having a human testify
to verify hearsay that she did not create is not as easy to track.
Moreover, the Court no longer includes determinations of reliability
in evidence to be part of the reason for calling a witness anyway.109
The Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that a lab
technician still must submit to cross-examination to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause seems to show intent to preserve the
Confrontation Clause as a procedural right. The procedural right to
confront one’s accuser makes sense on a human level, especially
when the person’s freedom is at stake; the idea of depriving liberty

105. As one scholar observed, “If physical presence alone truly meets the standard then the
reinvigorated Confrontation Clause has reach but no force.” Lisa K. Griffin, Circling Around
the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but Not a Robust Right, MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS, 2006, at 16, 21, http://www.michiganlawreview.org/articles/circling-around-theconfrontation-clause.
106. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999).
107. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968).
108. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
109. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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without affording opportunity for confrontation is disturbing.110 The
pre-Crawford Court acknowledged this intuitive aspect and described
its “ancient origins that pre-date the hearsay rule.”111 This procedural
rationale holds meaning because it exists in tandem with the truthverification purpose of the witness. We do not call witnesses for an
empty procedural dance, even if the Confrontation Clause guarantees
confrontation and not verification. (In this, it resembles other
procedural rights—not every witness will contribute meaningfully to
the truth-finding mission of a trial, but there is a guarantee to the basic
right of confrontation—and “[t]he Constitution entitles a criminal
defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”112).
Witnesses who take the stand merely to recite company policy or
generalized probabilities of error seem unlikely to impact
meaningfully the credibility of the evidence presented. When we as
criminal justice practitioners call in witnesses merely for satisfaction
of our own nagging consciences but without a good-faith expectation
of information that may contribute to exonerate or incriminate, does
not the Confrontation Clause look a ritualistic dance performed to sate
the judiciary’s desire for some trappings of justice in the system, even
if the trappings are hollow?113

110. The Confrontation Clause does not apply to civil cases, or to preliminary hearings
(though hearsay statements in preliminary hearings would not be admissible at trial without the
opportunity for testimony and cross-examination of the witness). See Barber, 390 U.S. at 725
(“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to crossexamine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness.”).
111. The Court wrote in Lilly v. Virginia, “The Court’s effort to tie the Clause so directly
to the hearsay rule is of fairly recent vintage, compare Roberts . . . with California v. Green,
while the Confrontation Clause itself has ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule.” Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 at 140 (citation omitted). In many of the Court’s earlier opinions, the
Court wrote from the foundational assumption that the Confrontation Clause is rooted in
principles older than the U.S. Constitution and derives its hearsay exceptions from principles of
justice. For instance, in 1898, the Court wrote in Reynolds v. United States that the forfeiture
rule “has its foundation in the [equitable] maxim that no one shall be permitted to take
advantage of his own wrong.” 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878). The Court noted that “this longestablished usage . . . has rarely been departed from” and is an “outgrowth of a maxim based on
the principles of common honesty.” Id.
112. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
113. In Williams v. Illinois, Justice Thomas proposed “limited application [of the clause] to
a narrow class of statements bearing indicia of solemnity,” which did not include the Cellmark
DNA report at issue. 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring). Precisely because
limited application lends itself to runarounds from the prosecution, Justice Kagan responded in
her dissent that this “would turn the Confrontation Clause into a constitutional geegaw—nice for
show, but of little value.” Id. at 2276.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND WHY THIS MATTERS
A. What’s at Stake?
As I have shown, there are snags at many different levels when
applying the Confrontation Clause to digital forensic evidence. I have
taken child pornography prosecution as a case study, but these
impediments apply to evidence surrounding other cyber crimes, and
to Internet evidence in kinetic world crime. Moreover, because other
constitutional rights are intertwined with Fourth Amendment
determinations, our confused case law concerning digital forensic
data can continue to reverberate in other contexts for the future.
For instance, the Fourth Amendment revolves around a
“reasonableness” standard for privacy. While judges educate
themselves on digital technology, practices such as Internet
vigilantism could affect our future expectations of privacy in digital
data.114 Companies’ data policies are delineating our expectations and
defining what evidence is available and in what context. Google
reported in its latest “Transparency Report”115 that U.S. agencies
made 8438 requests in the six-month period ending December 2012,
regarding 14,791 accounts. In keeping with Google’s stated policy,
the company provides envelope information without probable cause,
including the IP address where a Gmail account was created and
email headers such as “to,” “from” and “date” fields.116 Because
Internet crime is conducted on a landscape of privately-owned cyber
property, from domains to ISPs to cloud storage, the data policies that
companies adopt will continue to shape our expectations for what
Internet evidence is available and what is not.
The way in which we treat digital forensic data will also resonate
in the scope of the First Amendment. For instance, Cameron cited

114. This is especially likely in the case of crimes like child pornography where the
Internet community has a strong urge to self-regulate. In October 2011, prominent hacker group
Anonymous announced the launch of “Operation DarkNet,” in which it took down a server
hosting 40 child pornography sites and published the names of more than 1500 people who
visited “Lolita City,” the largest of the sites, which according to Anonymous contained more
than 100GB of child pornography. Press Release, Anonymous, OpDarkNet (Oct. 15, 2011),
available at http://pastebin.com/T1LHnzEW. Recall Anonymous’ enactment in 2007 of the first
instance of Internet vigilantism toward pedophiles, leading to the Chris Forcand arrest. See
Chris Forcand, ENCYCLOPEDIA DRAMATICA, https://encyclopediadramatica.es/Chris_forcand
(last modified Sept. 29, 2013).
115. Transparency
Report:
User
Data
Requests,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
116. David Kravets, Yahoo, Like Google, Demands Warrants for User E-mail, WIRED,
Jan. 25, 2013, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/yahoo-demands-warrants/.
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United States v. Jackson117 in his motion to federal district court. In
Jackson the Seventh Circuit had rejected the contention that Website
content constituted business records of the ISPs.118 The Cameron
district court rejected Cameron’s Jackson claim with the statement,
“the images are not hearsay to begin with . . . Jackson’s holding,
which affected postings—statements—on websites, does not extend
to images.”119 The First Circuit Cameron opinion never addressed
Jackson or the district court’s reasoning, but it is a useful prompt to
consider the dimensions of Internet data as speech.
B. The Need for a New Dialogue
I have argued in previous work that Internet violence is not
correctly conceived as a mere extension of kinetic world violence, but
is a manifestation of the particular characteristics and vulnerabilities
in our lives as Internet citizens.120 Similarly, I find that the
application online of evidentiary standards developed for kinetic
world crime can lead to frustrated situations that are far from the
justice that we seek.
For example, whereas child pornography distribution has long
been criminalized for a variety of philosophical reasons, the
determination to treat as a distinct criminal act each shared file as an
instance of distribution and each stored image as an act of possession
seems inappropriate in the Internet age of file-sharing applications. It
is unwieldy and leads to distorted outcomes. (It is also inefficient to
the extent that distribution prosecution requires the government to
navigate a showing of intent to distribute; intent is inherently difficult
to show in file-sharing, particularly when the accused is not a
sophisticated computer user and given that many file-sharing
applications have a default setting to share).

117.
118.

United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2000).
The court held:
The fact that the Internet service providers may be able to retrieve information
that its customers posted or email that its customers sent does not turn that
material into a business record of the Internet service provider. Any evidence
procured off the Internet is adequate for almost nothing, even under the most
liberal interpretations of the hearsay exception rules.
Id. at 637. See Susan Brenner, Child Pornography Was Not Hearsay, CYB3RCRIM3 (Feb. 4,
2011,
9:43
AM)
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2011/02/child-pornography-was-nothearsay.html.
119. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D. Me. 2011).
120. See Merritt Baer, Cyberstalking, and the Internet Landscape We Have Constructed,
15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 154 (2010).
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This in turn leads to problematic sentencing. Warranted societal
revulsion at the sexual victimization of children leads to political
tendency to continually strengthen sentences; also, there has been
insufficient revision to the sentencing guidelines to reflect Internet as
the forum for non-production child pornography crimes.
Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in extreme sentencing for nonproduction child pornography offenses.121
The United States Sentencing Commission released a recent
report on child pornography sentencing122 in which it characterized
the existing child pornography sentencing structure as “in need of
revision.”123 This is because “most of the enhancements in
2G2.2 . . . were promulgated when the typical offender obtained child
pornography in printed form in the mail.” Problematic sentencing in
cyber crime often can be traced to policies that are not well-suited to
Internet as a forum. The Sentencing Commission elaborated:
[A]s a result of recent changes in the computer and Internet
technologies that typical non-production offenders use, the existing
sentencing scheme in non-production cases no longer adequately
distinguishes among offenders based on their degrees of
culpability. Non-production child pornography offenses have
become almost exclusively Internet-enabled crimes; the typical
offender today uses modern Internet-based technologies such as
peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing programs. . . . The typical
offender’s collection not only has grown in volume but also
contains a wide variety of graphic sexual images (including images
of very young victims), which are now readily available on the

121. Child pornography sentencing is found at U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 2G2.1 and
2G2.2. See Current Versions of the Primary Child Pornography Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.
SENTENCING
COMM’N,
Feb.
2013,
app.
B,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/Appendix_B.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2013).
122. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
OFFENSES
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/.
123. Id.
at
i-xxvi,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/S
ex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_Pornography_Offenses/Executive_Summary.pdf.
The Commission identified factors that prompted their examination of these laws: (1) child
pornography cases are increasing; (2) judges are increasingly departing from the applicable
guidelines in non-production cases in the years since the sentencing guidelines became
“effectively advisory” in 2006; (3) the guidelines do not account for the use of Internet and filesharing in particular; and finally, social science and other criminal justice system stakeholders
consider the sentencing mode outdated. Id. at ii-iii.
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Internet.
As a result, four of the of six sentencing enhancements in
2G2.2—those relating to computer usage and the type and volume
of images possessed by offenders, which together account for 13
offense levels—now apply to most offenders and, thus, fail to
124
differentiate among offenders in terms of their culpability.

As a result of distorted outcomes, the Commission found that
judges are frequently choosing to depart from the sentencing
guidelines in child pornography cases.125 This, of course, undermines
the basic standardization purpose of sentencing guidelines.126
It is not merely child pornography prosecutions and sentencing
that will benefit from a broader reconsideration of the form and
function of the Confrontation Clause. It raises general concerns as to
the constitutional consequences when courts refuse to conceive of
criminal justice rights and remedies in the context of emerging
technologies. We ought to be concerned by allegiance to textualism
that results in a shrouded version of judicial activism, and often yields
bizarre or nonsensical results because it attempts to place eighteenthcentury process upon twenty-first-century situations. There is no
coherent “originalist” version of digital forensic evidence witnesses;
one does not absolve oneself of interpretive decision-making by
hinging it on dictionary definitions or one’s imagined version of
eighteenth-century intent.127

124. Id. at iii.
125. See id. “The average minimum of guideline ranges in non-production child
pornography offenses in fiscal year 2004 was 50.1 months, and the average sentence imposed
was 53.7 months; by fiscal year 2010, the average guideline minimum was 117.5 months, and
the average sentence imposed was 95.0 months.” See id. at n. 10.
126. See Pete Yost, Study: Sentencing in Child Porn Cases Uneven, THE WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/study-sentencing-in-child-porn-casesuneven/2013/02/28/a97082b0-813e-11e2-a350-49866afab584_story.html.
127. Justice Souter made this point in his Harvard 2010 Commencement speech:
[T]he fair reading model has only a tenuous connection to reality . . . So much for
the notion that all of constitutional law lies there in the Constitution waiting for a
judge to read it fairly . . . the very opportunity for conflict between one high
value and another reflects our confidence that a way may be found to resolve it
when a conflict arises. That is why the simplistic view of the Constitution
devalues our aspirations, and attacks that our confidence, and diminishes us.
Justice David H. Souter, Remarks at Harvard’s 359th Commencement, (May 27, 2010), in
HARVARD
GAZETTE,
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/text-of-justice-davidsouters-speech/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). See also Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of
Antonin
Scalia,
NEW
REPUBLIC,
Aug.
24,
2012,
available
at
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-readingthe-law-textual-originalism# (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
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Whereas the Court has held that the Confrontation Clause is a
particular right to confront the particular witness, in the case of child
pornography it is not clear whom that witness is. The Crawford
decision’s emphasis upon the Confrontation Clause as a procedural
right only exacerbates the inelasticity of applying it to new forms of
media. And (provided that general best practices in forensics and
rates of data error are available to introduce the average possibility of
error), if the proper witness in child pornography prosecution is the
forensic lab tech who printed out computer data, it is unclear what the
benefit of that opportunity to cross-examine will be, other than to
provide a logistical hurdle for the prosecution.
As we adjust to new manifestations of our selves online, we need
to adjust to new manifestations of Internet crime and criminal justice
responses. I do not suggest that the Confrontation Clause is
irrelevant; I do, however, advocate for a coherent version of it for the
digital world in which we use digital evidence. My impulse is
conservative; I seek to conserve the protections of the Sixth
Amendment.
I suggest that we begin to have a functional
conversation about what the Confrontation Clause right means in
context, without which we may end up losing the essential
preservation of justice for which it was written.

